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‘The civil virtues, that is to say, those virtues which relate to the common 
good and the advantage of human society, are infinitely better practised by 
women than by men.’  
 Caffiaux, Défences du beau sexe (1753). 
 
Throughout the eighteenth century a positive obsession existed with the idea 
of virtue.1 It was a word with many meanings, but from its earliest manifestation 
it had been deeply associated with ideals of manhood. It had originated as the 
Latin term ‘virtus’, derived from the word for a man, ‘vir’, and had meant those 
qualities which were deemed to be most worthy of man. Originally these were 
warlike qualities, above all, courage in battle. But for the Romans it had very soon 
been used to designate also the selfless dedication a man needed in order to be an 
active citizen in public life. In the classical republican tradition a man of virtue 
was one who put devotion to the public good before his own self advantage or 
the interests of his family. 
In eighteenth-century France this stern model of classical republican virtue 
was still very much a current idea. But there were also many competing ideas, or 
discourses, of virtue which vied for the attention of the reading public, including 
notions of Christian virtue, noble virtue, and monarchical virtue. Most 
significantly, from about the middle of the century a new concept had come to 
prominence. This was the idea of innate natural virtue. This natural virtue 
manifested itself in social terms. It was argued that all humanity was bound by 
common ties of sympathy. Such fellow-feeling made people wish to be of active 
benefit to each other and to help those less fortunate than themselves. This 
concept was not overtly political, in the sense of the classical republican 
formulation. But it conveyed the broader notion that men had civil 
responsibilities for fellow citizens and that their virtue legitimised their 
participation in public life.  
By the early 1750s the outlines of the ‘man of virtue’ had taken shape as an 
ideal of masculine social and political conduct. As a political model its influence 
would increase throughout the rest of the century and into the revolutionary 
period. He was a composite of qualities derived from older ideas of classical 
republicanism and newer concepts of natural virtue. There was space for 
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considerable variation within the model, but the main outlines were clear enough. 
Integrity was his most essential quality. He was independent, open, and 
‘incorruptible’, both in public and in private life. He was a citizen, devoted to his 
patrie, and to his fellow citizens. This devotion was by no means incompatible 
with his loyalty to the monarchy, but it was based on the assumption that the 
monarch also served the best interests of the patrie. The ‘man of virtue’ was, like 
the hero of Mackenzie’s novel, a ‘man of feeling’ (sensibilité ). His natural impulses 
were good though he was generally depicted as being able to ‘master’ his 
emotions when necessary. He took his familial obligations with the utmost 
seriousness, and was an exemplary father, son and husband. His image formed a 
marked contrast with that of the ‘aristocratic libertine’, or even with the ‘man of 
honour’ whose self-esteem derived from his social appearance and prestige.  
 
But sex, of course, made all the difference. A French schoolboy of the 
educated classes could read about the courageous exploits of Marcus Brutus, or 
the Gracchi. These were renowned heroes a boy could aspire to model his own 
behaviour on - at least in their reveries. But his sister was most unlikely to have 
been allowed much access to the classics, or to have been taught the Latin or 
Greek needed to read them in the original.2 If she did become acquainted with 
such texts the role models of virtuous women therein were likely to make for 
depressing reading, hardly heroines one would burn to emulate. The tale of the 
founding of the Roman republic was based on a woman’s virtue, it is true. 
Lucretia’s rape and subsequent suicide provided the initial inspiration for the 
overthrow of tyranny and establishment of the republic. Lucretia’s self-sacrifice 
was perhaps unlikely to appeal overmuch to girls reading the classics. Women of 
the ancient classical world generally were of low status and were supposed to 
stay in the privacy of their homes and leave public virtue to the men. An 
exception was the Spartan women who dedicated themselves to public virtue by 
being so unnatural as to exult in the death of their sons for the fatherland and 
instructed their sons setting off to war. ‘Come back with your shield or on it’: that 
is, better dead than a coward. It was hardly a tender portrait of motherhood. 
French girls were far more likely to be familiar with the Christian tradition. There 
they would find a different kind of feminine virtue, one achieved primarily 
through passive suffering. Its inspiration was the anguish of the Madonna, the 
loving but submissive wife and mother; her sorrows would only be assuaged in 
heaven.  
 
The nature of women’s relationship to virtue presents us with an important, 
 3 
though complex, set of problems. The politics of virtue dealt mainly with the 
public world and therefore, by definition, was concerned mostly with the public 
life of men. But the public realm of political virtue also had its reverse side: 
exclusion, private life and femininity. Important new work has begun to map out 
political practice and political theory in terms of distinctions based on gender 
roles.3 Few subjects in eighteenth-century studies have been as contentious as the 
relationship between political theory and gender. This debate has been original 
and illuminating, and the present work is much indebted to new works in this 
field. But some aspects of the debate have been couched in somewhat 
anachronistic terms and address present-day concerns which would have held 
little meaning for people in the eighteenth century. Whilst not at all attempting to 
deny the interest of such a theoretical approach, the present article takes a slightly 
different stance. It will seek to examine ideas about women’s virtue through the 
voices of people of the time  - both women and men who were concerned with the 
social and moral position of women. It will seek to explain their ideas in ways 
which would have had some meaning for people of the time, in their own terms. 
It is that eighteenth-century understanding of the nature - and social and political 
potential-  of women’s virtue that we shall seek to uncover here.  
The public face of masculine virtue was based on certain assumptions about 
the role of women and the complementary qualities which they brought to 
society. Under absolute monarchy women were almost entirely excluded from 
political power. There were a very few - but notable - exceptions: one or two royal 
wives, and certain royal mistresses who had won the trust of the king and whose 
influence extended beyond the bedroom into court politics and royal patronage. 
Noblewomen might sometimes be players in the patronage system if 
circumstances (usually widowhood) had given them control over land and 
property. For the most part, though, women were conspicuous by their absence 
both from political practice and political theory. Nor were there any calls before 
the Revolution for the political enfranchisement of women. In a society where all 
men but the king were excluded from political rights there was no sense that 
women needed - or were entitled to - political representation. Those women close 
to the throne who did exert indirect power were often resented for what was 
perceived to be a corruption of royal authority. Often the most vitriolic of their 
attackers were courtiers who felt that they had unjustly been excluded from 
patronage and honours due to the interference of over-powerful women.4 This 
attitude was very much in line with classical republican traditions of thought 
whereby women were seen as the antithesis of republican virtue, prone to 
ignorance and love of luxury and using their seductive wiles to wield excessive 
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influence over men. 
Hostility towards women in public life is most apparent in the treatment of 
the only women who occupied an official place close to the source of legitimate 
political authority in the ancien régime - the queens of France. Salic law meant no 
woman could rule in her own right. Queens such as Anne of Austria and, before 
her, Catherine de Medici who had exercised political power during the minority 
of their sons, had been bitterly resented for it.5 Antagonism towards queens 
combined two popular prejudices: distrust of women engaging in politics, and 
suspicion aroused by the presence of a foreign interest at the heart of the French 
government. The virtues of queens were different in character to those of kings, 
and the actions of queens had always been more circumscribed and held to be 
more publicly accountable.6  
Stanislas, the exiled king of Poland and father-in-law of Louis XV offered 
conventional advise to his daughter, Marie Leczinska on how to comport herself 
as queen of France. He stated that the French public, being an ‘enlightened 
people’ was the rightful judge of the queen’s actions, and could demand of her 
‘the virtues which it had the right to claim’. A queen’s virtues should include her 
resignation of any ties to her own people. The conduct of politics was also outside 
her sphere: she should not attempt ‘to penetrate the veils which cover the secrets 
of the state.’7 Marie Leczinska attracted public sympathy for the way in which she 
was seen to conform to this self-effacing model. She was repeatedly said to be a 
model of queenly or ‘humble’ virtues. She was devout; she patiently bore with her 
husband’s neglect and repeated infidelity; her chastity was beyond question; she 
produced royal sons to whom she might impart her own virtues; and finally she 
went quietly and uncomplainingly into her grave.8  In fact, however, she probably 
had little choice: her potential to have a high political profile at court was severely 
limited by the fact that her father was, to all intents and purposes, reduced to 
being little more than Louis XV’s pensioner.  
During Louis XV’s reign, the opprobrium lavished on ‘political’ women was 
directed, not against the queen, but against his mistresses; above all, Madame de 
Pompadour and Madame du Barry. In the anti-monarchical propaganda of the 
time, whilst Marie Leczinska epitomised queenly virtue: they stood for vice. 
Indeed, it appears that Marie Leczinska herself actively helped to encourage this 
identification. Together with her son, the Dauphin, she was a leader of the dévot 
faction at court. As such, despite the strictures against queens ‘meddling’ in 
politics, she was not above some discreet political manipulation herself. The dévot 
faction worked to promote the view that Madame de Pompadour in particular 
was corrupting the political order by exerting an undue influence over the king. 
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These rumours circulated widely, going beyond court circles into the clandestine 
press, and shaping popular opinion on the matter. Ironically (for this was hardly 
the intention of the dévots) such rumours tended to undermine respect for the 
monarch himself.9 
With Marie-Antoinette it was a different matter. In the clandestine press, and 
in the minds of the reading public, she was notoriously held to be the very 
personification of vice in the body politic: the very reverse of the ‘humble virtues’ 
of her predecessor. This hostility arose from several causes. It was partly a 
consequence of continuing suspicion of the Hapsburgs as long-standing enemies 
of France. It was also the result of Marie-Antoinette’s failure to understand the 
French court so that she recklessly gave offence to leading court nobles. But it was 
also due to her husband being genuinely devoted to her, and taking no mistresses 
as his grandfather had done, thus laying himself open to accusations of 
uxoriousness. In the minds of the public she thus combined the political power of 
a queen with the sexual power of a mistress.  
Her ‘queenly vices’ were characterised as: sexual infidelity to her husband 
(and by extension treachery to France), lavish spending, indifference to the 
sufferings of the poor and oppressed, the furtherance of corruption at court, and 
interference in politics and the appointment of ministers. There was very little 
substance in these stories - but in a sense that hardly mattered. John Hardman has 
argued that in fact Marie-Antoinette took little part in political decision-making 
until after the political disaster for the monarchy of the Assembly of Notables in 
1787. But by that time her image had already been irreversibly damaged in the 
eyes of the public. Initially the hostile image of Marie-Antoinette was fostered by 
factions at court who were excluded from the circle of those who had ready access 
to the king and queen and took revenge for the undoubted ineptness of the royal 
couple at handling the system of patronage and faction which was the life-blood 
of the courtier. But the Affair of the Diamond Necklace went far beyond court 
circles, and appeared to confirm all the rumours about the queen’s conspicuous 
consumption and sexual corruption. More than any other single event, that 
particular scandal undermined the authority of the monarchy in the eyes of the 
public. The monarchy emerged from the sorry affair looking either depraved or 
ludicrous, depending on one’s opinion. The issue of the representation of a 
woman’s virtue - or lack of it- was a key factor in undermining traditional respect 
for monarchical authority in the precarious unstable political context of the later 
1780s.10 For women close to the throne and the source of power, the only kind of 
acceptable virtue was that of the silent, submissive, chaste, devout and fertile 
queen.  
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But the main question we shall address here is the relationship between 
ordinary women and the politics of virtue. Where women did feature more 
positively was in broader conceptions of society and their role within it. In the 
areas of family life, moral example, and philanthropy, the importance of women 
as a moral force - a force for virtue - was frequently asserted. Although women 
were supposed to confine themselves to the private sphere and family life, it was 
often claimed that since the family was the foundation of the wider community, 
women's private influence had implications for society as a whole.  
The question of how women fitted into the premises of political virtue was 
intensely problematic. Political virtue was presented as a transparent and 
egalitarian attribute: a quality which was within the compass of every citizen to 
attain. It was said to demand independence of thought and material 
circumstances, strength of purpose, clear-sightedness and rational thought - all 
qualities which were commonly believed to be the province of men alone. The 
ideal of the virtuous citizen was not constituted from an objective political 
category; rather, it was grounded in contemporary perceptions of what it meant 
to be a man. The concept of masculine virtue cannot be understood in isolation 
from its feminine counterpart: each set the boundaries, strengths and limitations 
of the other. Male political public virtue could be enabled and facilitated by the 
notion that the virtue of women consisted in upholding the private sphere, in 
tending to their homes, children and family life, and in maintaining the 
respectability of their house through exemplary chastity. Contemporary notions 
of femininity provided a counterpoint to the traditional concept of civic virtue; 
femininity served as a contrast which emphasised the manliness, strength and 
legitimacy of civic virtue.  
 
We need, therefore, to consider how political virtue was mediated by 
conceptions of gender, conceptions which were played out around the parallel 
themes of masculine and feminine, public and private, and vice and virtue. In 
particular, we will examine a variety of models of female virtue for what they can 
tell us about the ways in which the relationship between women and the political 
realm was constructed and debated. It has been argued with some force that the 
discourse of virtue marginalised the political role of women.11 Because women 
were cut off, both from formal political structures and from political theory, ideas 
about women must be sought in alternative sources: works such as novels, 
conduct books, and tracts on education, all of which featured some very 
contrasting models of virtuous femininity. 
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Part of the difficulty, of course, is that there were different ways of speaking 
about virtue which stemmed from very different traditions of thought. Discourses 
of Christian virtue, classical republican virtue, and natural virtue, all varied in 
their portrayal of the relationship between the respective roles of the sexes vis à 
vis the wider community. The idea most often invoked was that, just as men and 
women were different in character, so masculine and feminine virtue were also 
inherently different. But since there was by no means agreement as to the nature 
of masculinity and femininity, so also there was not always a consensus as to the 
exact nature and extent of women’s capacity for virtue. According to the more 
mysogynist commentators, feminine virtue was puny and weak. Their most 
prized virtue was their chastity - and even in this respect women were constantly 
in need of supervision for they were all too susceptible to seduction. Other 
commentators took a contrasting view and saw feminine virtue as a positive 
attribute in its own right, a moral and spiritual purity which extended far beyond 
the physical boundaries of chastity. Its character was complementary to that of 
masculine virtue, but was confined within the domestic or private sphere. In 
addition, we shall see that it was occasionally argued that virtue did not vary 
according to gender, and that masculine and feminine virtue were essentially the 
same moral quality.  
 
In the remainder of this article I shall outline the traditional parameters of 
feminine virtue concentrating on the first half of the century. In a second article I 
will go on to examine the impact of new ideas of natural virtue which emerged 
from about the mid-century. The traditional meaning of virtue as a manly quality 
made the idea of a ‘virtuous woman’ almost a contradiction in terms. A woman 
who aspired to virtue might find herself described in unappealing and 
disparaging terms as a ‘virago’, signifying a woman who had transgressed the 
natural boundaries of gender and become too much like a man for her own good. 
There would seem then on the face of it to have been little scope for women to 
claim the rhetoric of virtue for themselves. But in practice there was a surprising 
degree of flexibility in the meanings imparted to feminine virtue and their social 
significance.  
Certain key ideas about the virtues of women in the eighteenth century had 
roots in the complex traditions of classical antiquity. The link between  female 
chastity and the maintenance of the social order went back at least as far as the 
Romans although they generally kept the term ‘virtus’ exclusively for public 
masculine virtue, and used a separate word for female chastity, ‘pudicitia’. Thus 
for the Romans, if not for their eighteenth-century readers, chastity was not the 
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exact feminine equivalent of manly virtue. Amongst the Romans a woman’s 
virtue was held to consist partly in her chastity, but also in loyalty to her husband, 
and devotion to her children. Of these virtues, the highest was loyalty to a 
husband. Female adultery was designated a public offence by the Emperor 
Augustus notwithstanding the fact that he himself was a notable adulterer. He 
stated that the decline of Roman society was the inevitable consequence of 
women taking lovers. Indeed it was a perennial theme among Roman authors to 
lament the decline of moral standards amongst their people and attribute this to 
the sexual incontinence of Roman women. By contrast, the historian Tacitus in his 
account of the German tribes attributed much of their warlike strength to the 
formidable chastity of their women: a chastity which, unlike that of Roman ladies, 
was not subjected to the temptations afforded by social occasions such as dinner 
parties.12 On the rare occasions when women of the German tribes weakened and 
succumbed to lovers’ blandishments, they were publicly whipped and disgraced. 
Military strength - and thus male virtus -  stemmed from a man being able to rely 
on the fidelity of his wife. The archetypal classical republican model of virtuous 
femininity was the mother of republican heroes, typified by Cornelia, mother of 
the Gracchi: because she had learned virtue herself she was able to teach it to her 
children. But the most positive view of women’s virtue amongst the classical 
authors came from Plutarch. In his essay on the ‘Bravery of Women’ (Mulierum 
Virtutes) he stated his disagreement with the idea that the most virtuous woman 
is she who is least talked about, that is, she who remains chaste in the home and 
does not play any kind of part in public affairs. On the contrary, Plutarch said, 
‘man’s virtues and woman’s virtues are one and the same’ and he went on to give 
examples to prove his case.13 But this position was rarely adopted either in the 
classical world or amongst eighteenth-century commentators. 
The Christian legacy was equally complex and influential. Christian beliefs 
about the moral virtue of women were complex and often ambiguous. For 
traditional Church patriarchs, the moral strength of women was highly suspect, a 
view dating back to Eve, the original transgressor and temptress of man. On the 
other hand the idea that the moral virtue of men and women was equal (at least in 
potential) also had a strong basis in Christian thought. In 1596, Alexandre de 
Pont-Aymery sought to demonstrate in his Paradoxe apologique that ‘...woman has 
achieved a much higher level of perfection than man in every act of virtue’; whilst 
in 1618, the Chevalier de l’Escale in Le Champion des femmes claimed that women 
were more perfect, more noble and more virtuous than men.14 This ideal recalled 
the Virgin Mary, rather than the fallible Eve. She was capable of the purest virtue, 
but it was based on a mother’s love for her children and did not translate easily 
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into a public role. Such virtue was as humble as it was pure.  
The belief in woman as the source of moral purity depended on her 
maintenance of her sexual purity. The basis of a woman’s moral virtue, therefore, 
was her chastity (la pudeur). The identification of the word virtue with feminine 
chastity came relatively late into the dictionaries, from about 1700, although it 
was in common use for some considerable time before that date. Chastity was 
commonly held to be the most fundamental of feminine virtues. Chastity was not 
normally seen as an essential virtue for men in the same way, the only exception 
being the formal obligation for men in holy orders to embrace celibacy in their 
vows. Occasionally more radical clerics did insist in their sermons that chastity 
was as vital for men as it was for women, and for devout Catholics this conferred 
a serious obligation in terms of their duty to God.15 But the double standard was 
firmly entrenched in every aspect of more worldly society. There were no 
effective social penalties against a man who transgressed sexually in the way that 
there were for women. He would find admittance everywhere, even if his 
reputation for dissolute behaviour was public knowledge. 
In almost every text on women’s virtue in this period it was claimed, or 
simply assumed, that a woman’s most essential virtue was her chastity, or at least 
the appearance of chastity, the latter being in some ways even more essential than 
the former. Women writers were less likely to challenge this convention than 
were men, for the penalties for transgression were theirs alone. Without chastity 
no woman from the ‘respectable’ classes, could hope to enjoy a secure social 
position. The only women who could afford to flout this convention were those 
from the poorest classes (who were not part of the reading public and therefore 
outside this debate) and women from the highest elite, the court nobility, and 
those who moved in the most exclusive Paris circles. For a woman of the higher 
classes to engage in a liaison was not considered nearly so shocking or immoral as 
to flaunt the fact publicly. For such women, the most vital virtue was discretion. It 
was very difficult for women writers not to conform to conventional ideas about 
feminine virtue as chastity in their writings, even if their private lives told a 
different story. 
Madame de Genlis offered a notable instance of this flexible attitude. She 
was infamous for having had a liaison with the duc de Chartres (later d'Orléans) 
and was widely believed to have borne him a daughter, though her husband took 
a properly complacent attitude. In later years she became governess to Chartres' 
children and took on a public role as an author of works on education, which was 
one of the few respectable careers available to women. Her books, however, were 
far more conventional than her life. Like many others, she wrote a book in praise 
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of virtue, her Annales de la vertu for the edification of young minds, wherein she 
solemnly informed her readers that adultery was a far more heinous offence for 
women than it was for men, especially if a woman attempted to pass off a lover's 
child as her husband's.16 Like so many educational tracts, the Annales de la vertu 
consisted of morally-improving examples of virtue from history. Madame de 
Genlis argued that such a book was all the more necessary since Plutarch's Lives, 
though so instructive a book, contained many stories unsuitable for young 
persons.17 Amongst the anecdotes that she considered suitable for sensitive young 
girls was an account of young Chinese girls who drowned themselves rather than 
suffer 'a fate worse than death' at the hands of the emperor; whilst another story 
recounted how, at the taking of Acre in 1291, the sisters of the convent of Sainte-
Claire mutilated themselves so as to avoid rape by the Saracens.18 By contrast, her 
stories about boys and men concentrated much more on concrete achievements 
such as military victories and building cities, though loyalty, filial piety and 
generosity to the poor also figured strongly. In many respects her account was a 
typical rendering of standard models of male and female virtue.  
 
The ideal of the ‘honest woman’ (honnête femme) - a classic model for 
feminine conduct in the first half of the century - was based on notions of 
respectable, restrained behaviour An honnête femme was a woman who bowed to 
social constraints and did not openly struggle against the values of ‘the world’. 
Like the honnête homme (her male equivalent) she sprang from the court, and the 
most elevated Parisian circles. Her virtue was concerned with the morality of the 
individual, inner peace and tranquillity, rather than with virtue as a social or 
active quality. The key point about her virtue was its moderation. This attitude is 
illustrated in Madame de Châtelet’s Traité de bonheur (1748 though not published 
till 1779 after her death and that of her former lover, Voltaire). Unlike later 
writers, she had relatively little to say about virtue. She saw moral virtue as a 
necessary ingredient for happiness, but it was a discreet, inconspicuous quality, 
one that did not offend society by embracing extremes: ‘...one has to be at ease 
with oneself ... and it is vain to hope to enjoy this satisfaction without virtue’.19  
By happiness she meant the achievement of personal tranquillity and equilibrium. 
Despite being an intensely intellectual woman, a mathematician and physicist, 
she was still subject to the constrictions society placed upon her sex. The most 
poignant passages of her book dwelt on how women might keep their dignity 
whilst coping with the grief of unhappy love affairs and faithless lovers. 
Such an emphasis on the appearance of morality frequently encouraged the 
kind of cynicism we encounter in the writing of Madame de Puisieux, a member 
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of the salon world of the philosophes, and for some time a mistress of Diderot. She 
wrote with a lightly ironical touch about society’s double standards and how they 
obliged women to become devious and adopt stratagems in order to do as they 
wished whilst appearing to acquiesce. In her Conseils à une Amie, she wrote that a 
woman’s conduct must conform to the requirements of ‘the world’, and that one 
must live, ‘if not with virtue, at least with the appearance of it.’20 She suggested 
that rather than trying to fight society’s conventions, it was in women’s best 
interests to accept a situation they could not alter but to ensure that they 
manipulated it to their advantage. In Les Caractères, she compiled her alternative 
version of a ‘good conduct’ book, by which she meant worldly rather than 
virtuous conduct and illustrated the difference by recounting the following 
anecdote: 
Someone asked one day at a social gathering which was the virtue most 
necessary to us; almost all the women were of the opinion that it was 
chastity; but one replied, ‘you deceive yourselves, it is discretion. I am sixty 
years old, and I have the reputation of being chaste: only I know whether 
my reputation is deserved.’ This frankness ended the debate; they 
considered that the woman who had spoken was justified by experience, 
and no one thought any the less of her virtue.21 
Such worldly cynicism was in the salon style typified by La Rochefoucauld. 
There was little place here for the idea of authentic virtue; indeed, it was a 
concept which appeared faintly ridiculous: 
Happy is he who possesses virtue in moderation. I have noticed that 
people who take virtue to excess are simply unbearable both to themselves 
and to others. I have also noticed that no one envies you for your virtues.... 
22 
 
The contrast between such sceptical attitudes towards feminine virtue, and the 
vogue for ‘authentic’ virtue in the 1770s and 1780s is striking. When, many years 
later, that earnest young republican, Madame Roland encountered the now aged 
Madame de Puisieux so redolent of an older and supposedly frivolous generation, 
she wrote in shocked tones of how disillusioned she had been by the meeting, and 
pointedly exclaimed that a woman so lacking in decency should never have 
written about morality.23 
But if women were concerned only with maintaining the appearance of 
virtue, was this a consequence of innate female shallowness and incapacity for 
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moral integrity, or rather, was it because a more positive role was closed off from 
them so that they were obliged them to confine themselves to social trivia? This 
was a question which taxed both male and female moralists. No less an authority 
than Fénelon  had argued that there was a direct link between the education of 
girls and the public good. He endorsed the view that women should not play a 
direct role in public life and should immerse themselves within family life, but he 
argued that the family itself was directly linked to the good of the wider 
community. From this he concluded that it was no less important to teach virtue 
to girls than it was for boys. The female version would be different in character, 
befitting their contrasting roles, but its ultimate aim was to instil morality and a 
sense of social usefulness. He justified this view through the Christian doctrine of 
equality of souls, rather than in terms of classical republicanism. 
These then are the occupations of women, which are hardly less important 
to the public than those of men, because women have a house to run, a 
husband to make happy, children to bring up well. Let us add that virtue is 
no less important to women than to men; without speaking of the good or 
bad that they can do in the public world, they are half the human race, 
saved by the blood of Jesus Christ and destined for eternal life.24 
 
The ideal of the honnête femme found one of its most eloquent spokeswomen 
in Madame de Lambert. Writing in the moralist tradition of the earlier part of the 
century, she brought to the subject an acute awareness of the differences in the 
ways in which society understood morality for men and for women. She herself 
was from the noblesse de robe. She was early left a widow and had been obliged to 
bring up her children in relatively straitened financial circumstances and amidst 
perpetual lawsuits. Though famous for her salon, which boasted many of the 
most distinguished men of her day including Montesquieu, Fontenelle and 
Marivaux, she was acutely aware that at every level society closed off 
opportunities for women. In a private letter she confided bitter thoughts, ‘I have 
never thought, monsieur, that I would be anything but ignored, or that I had any 
choice but to stay in the nothingness to which it pleases men to restrict us.’25 She 
accepted what she felt could not be altered and proved hesitant to publish her 
own creative efforts as a writer; her works only began to appear in print in the 
1720s. She considered that the emphasis on chastity at all costs was one of the 
ways in which men forced women into social subordination and the private 
sphere. But she was not content to see this as the only virtue women could 
achieve. She explored the idea of male and female virtue through her writings on 
the education of her own children. She accepted that there were differences; but 
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for both sexes she saw virtue as an essential quality, based on inner integrity. For 
her son she envisaged the classic career for a boy of his rank, as a military officer 
and leader of men. In her Avis d’une Mère à son Fils (1726) she wrote that for a boy 
of his class everyone agreed that the most important virtues were military; virtues 
that would lead a young man to glory and public renown. But military virtues 
alone were not enough to constitute a hero. ‘The idea of a Hero is incompatible 
with the idea of a man without justice, without probity, and without greatness of 
soul. It is not enough to have the honour that comes from social worth, the 
honour that comes from probity is just as important. All the virtues must be 
united in order to make a hero.’26 Nor did wealth or luxury make for virtue, 
‘riches have never imparted Virtue...’27 She warned her son that it was virtue 
rather than noble birth which gave a man the right to lead others. Without virtue, 
she said, ‘You are a usurper of authority ... In an Empire where Reason ruled 
everyone would be equal and there would be no social distinctions but those of 
Virtue.’28 Despite these admonitions, her intention was to give her son confidence 
in his right to exercise public virtues through a military career. 
When she turned to the education of girls in the Avis d’une Mère à sa Fille 
(1728) there was a dramatic difference in tone. Girls had been unfairly neglected. 
They too had an important role to play in the world, and should have the 
appropriate education to fit them for their task in life. Women played a pivotal 
role as wives, mothers, and educators of young children. Virtue was as important 
for girls as for boys and it entailed far more than chastity. Certainly chastity was 
expected of a girl, because ‘the world’ required it of her, but also because of 
‘conscience’, and for Madame de Lambert, it was the inner voice of conscience 
that mattered more than public opinion.29 Not for girls, however, the glory and 
renown of masculine virtue. ‘The glamorous virtues are not the lot of women; 
they content themselves with the simple and quiet virtues. Renown does not 
concern itself with us,’ she wrote wistfully. But far from concluding that this 
meant that woman’s virtue was of less value than that of men she thought it an 
even greater achievement. ‘Women’s virtues are hard to sustain, because glory 
does not smooth the path to attaining them. Confine yourself to your home; busy 
yourself with your family and your own affairs; be simple, just and modest; these 
are painful virtues because they are hidden in obscurity. It needs a great deal of 
merit to flee public renown, and a great deal of courage to consent to be virtuous 
only in your own sight.’30 
It followed that women should have the same moral virtue as men. ‘An 
honnête Femme has the same virtues as Men; friendship, probity, responsibility 
towards her duties.’31 But women’s education had been neglected. Girls, like 
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boys, should be taught to be thinking moral beings. Girls should learn practical 
sciences, morals, philosophy, Latin (but no Italian, this being ‘the language of 
love’ and dangerous for young girls), history, and the classics, for it was in the 
classical authors that girls would find examples of public virtue.32 But Madame 
de Lambert’s view of virtue was still very much in the mould of traditional moral 
writing and imbued with pessimism about the possibilities open to women. Her 
emphasis was on building inner resources, strength of mind, individual integrity 
and the construction of a moral self in the face of a hostile world. It did not stretch 
beyond to the sphere of social virtue. 
 
 There is a curious paradox in the fact that women were, on the one hand, 
excluded from public acts of virtue, whilst, on the other hand, their virtue was 
considered to be very much a matter of public judgement. The public reputation 
of a woman’s husband and children rested on her chastity. Masculine public 
virtue claimed for itself the right to be spoken about, to attract glory. Women’s 
virtue was measured insofar as women were not talked about. Because so much 
emphasis was laid upon the appearance of virtue it could seem at times as though 
women were being encouraged to practice deception more than genuine virtue.  
We can examine this problem in more detail by comparing attitudes towards 
two famous examples of feminine virtue; one in the classical republican 
repertoire, the other in the Christian tradition. These are Lucretia and Susannah. 
The former, surprised in her bed at night by Tarquinius, son of the last Roman 
king, whose ambition it was to seduce a woman with an unrivalled reputation for 
virtue, at first tried to fight him off. What finally overcame Lucretia’s resistance 
was his threat to kill not only her but also his slave, then leave the two bodies 
naked in her bed and claim that he had caught them in the act of adultery and so 
slew them. It would thus be assumed - by her husband and the world - that she 
had been unfaithful to her husband and, even more shamefully, that her lover 
had been a slave. Unable to bear the thought that the world would pass 
judgement on her, Lucretia ceased to struggle. But afterwards she avenged herself 
by committing suicide in front of her husband, father and Junius Brutus to wipe 
out the shame of rape with her blood, having first made the men swear to destroy 
Tarquinius. Lucretia thus precipitated the destruction of the Roman monarchy 
and the founding of the Republic. But it could be said that she represented a 
negative model, for she provoked public action whilst taking no part in it herself. 
Her only action was to turn death on herself as the only way of ‘proving’ that she 
was virtuous, that is, that she had not consented to the rape.33 
Lucretia’s action provoked a great deal of hostile comment from Christian 
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theologists for appearing to advocate self-destruction. One of the most thoughtful 
discussions of this subject appeared in the moralist, Champdevaux’s L’Honneur 
considéré en lui-même (1752) an extended discussion of false honour which was 
compared unfavourably with ‘true’ honour, or virtue.34 He contrasted the actions 
of Lucretia with those of the Biblical heroine, Susannah. As recounted in the 
Apocrypha, Susannah, when similarly threatened with rape by the hypocritical 
Elders, resisted their attempts at seduction. They offered her the choice either that 
she would submit to them and keep her public reputation intact, or that they 
would make a false accusation that she was unchaste, thus exposing her to public 
vilification and death. She chose the latter - though Daniel saved her at the last 
moment. Champdevaux claimed that Susannah was more truly virtuous than 
Lucretia for she had preferred to risk public shame and death rather than lose her 
true virtue. By contrast, Lucretia had finally acquiesced to the loss of her chastity 
out of fear of being thought not chaste. 
Susannah resists the importunities of the elders because of her love of 
virtue, Lucretia gives in to Tarquinius for fear of what people will think 
about her if he carries out his threats.35 
 
Champdevaux admitted that Lucretia’s choice seemed at first sight more 
impressive, in that she chose her own time and place to die; she was not to be put 
to death as a criminal. Moreover, she died surrounded by those who loved her 
and were aware of her innocence, and she had first ensured that her death would 
be avenged. Susannah would have had no such comfort but, according to 
Champdevaux, this made her action the more moral. She had chosen genuine 
virtue rather than the public appearance of a virtuous woman. Her vindication 
would be in God’s eyes, and in her own conscience, not in public opinion. 
Susannah’s story epitomised the ideal of the Christian woman who mutely suffers 
temporal injustice. Her virtue would not help the people around her, including 
those she most cared about; it would not help even herself. But her virtue would 
result in her soul’s ultimate salvation. In the meantime her example offered 
consolation and a kind of empowerment to the devout by claiming that the 
difficulties and injustices which were the frequent lot of women’s lives were 
known to God: he at least recognised and valued their moral worth. 
Champdevaux’s account was notable not only because it was framed as a contrast 
between pagan and Christian models of feminine virtue, but also because he 
claimed that social appearances were not integral to authentic feminine virtue. He 
used this model of authentic feminine Christian virtue as an example of ‘true 
honour’ to illustrate how morally inadequate was the courtly version of  ‘false 
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honour’ based on appearances. As so often, women’s chastity stood for the moral 
health of society as a whole. 
 
From about the middle of the century the model of the honnête femme began 
to fall out of favour. She appeared to stand too much for the court and courtly 
standards of behaviour which were being increasingly associated with lack of true 
integrity. It is significant that when in 1748, François-Vincent Toussaint published 
Les Moeurs, his key work on the social importance of natural virtue, he made a 
point of dedicating it not to a man of high rank and social standing, as was 
customary, but to a woman (identified as Madame M.A. T.***), whose social rank 
was the same as his own but who was, he said, the embodiment of virtue in 
human form.36 Here a woman provided a model of virtue which contained within 
itself sufficient moral legitimacy to challenge the moral authority that had 
previously clung to rank and privilege. Significantly, women’s virtue was 
depicted as morally superior to the advantages that came with birth. Toussaint 
attacked the ideal of the honnête femme (much as elsewhere he criticised the 
courtly notion of the honnête homme). He was particularly scathing about the 
complacent belief that in order to be virtuous a woman had only to be faithful to 
her husband. In one of his coded references to a woman of high social rank, an 
‘honnête femme’ whom he called ‘Thémire’, he criticised the narrow code of values 
which she espoused and called virtue: 
... she thought that chastity takes the place of all the virtues; and that a 
woman can be termed ‘good’ so long as she is faithful to her husband, even 
though she be moody and nagging, tyrannises her children and harangues 
the servants, sneers at people and maligns them, and cheats at card games. 
By modelling your behaviour on hers you will no doubt be honest women: 
but will you be women of merit?37 
 Chastity and respectability were not a substitute for virtue. The honnête 
femme appeared cold and without feeling; she had stifled that natural sensibility 
which would give her social virtue. A new kind of virtuous woman was about to 
take her place. 
 
Note: All the translations in this article, except where specifically 
acknowledged, are the author’s own. 
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